![]() Charles Wick, his longtime friend and head of the U.S. He lets me come closer than anyone else, but there are times when even I feel that barrier.” 2 His advisers agreed. Ronnie was a “loner,” Nancy Reagan wrote in her memoir. But he was also opaque, remote, distant, and inscrutable. Ronald Reagan was convivial, upbeat, courteous, respectful, self-confident, and humble. ![]() Paradoxically, then, Reagan nurtured the dynamics that won the Cold War by focusing on ways to end it. Reagan’s sincerity, goodwill, strong desire for negotiations, and shared commitment to nuclear abolition (however abstract) reassured Gorbachev, helping to sustain a trajectory whose end results the Soviet leader did not foresee or contemplate. Reagan, however, strove to consummate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, push forward on strategic arms reductions, and solidify his relationship with a pliable Soviet leader who was trying to reshape his own country. After 1985, many of Reagan’s national security advisers, intelligence analysts, and political allies disdained the president’s nuclear abolitionism, distrusted Gorbachev, and exaggerated the strength and durability of the Soviet regime. These priorities inspired Reagan to make overtures to Soviet leaders gain a better understanding of their fears and, eventually, to engage Gorbachev with conviction, empathy, and geniality. But his significance stemmed less from the arms buildup and ideological offensive that he launched at the onset of his presidency in 1981 than from his desires to abolish nuclear weapons, tamp down the strategic arms race, and avoid Armageddon. His role was important, albeit not as important as Mikhail Gorbachev’s. Nonetheless, the growing documentary record, along with memoirs and oral histories, allows for a more careful assessment of Reagan’s personal impact on the endgame of the Cold War. When reading memoirs about Reagan and interviews with his advisers, what impresses and surprises the most is that the “great communicator” was regarded as “impenetrable” by many of those who adored him, who worked for him, and who labored to impress his legacy on the American psyche. ![]() 1įiguring out what Ronald Reagan wanted to do, or, more precisely, what things he wanted most to do, may be an impossible task. Noting these contradictions and Reagan’s competing impulses, some writers even claim that he wanted to do all of these things. Some say he wanted to abolish nuclear weapons and yearned for a more peaceful world others say he built up American capabilities, prepared to wage nuclear war, and sought to destroy communism and the evil empire that embodied it. Others claim he wanted to end the Cold War. Scholars love debating the role of Ronald Reagan in the Cold War. He was Gorbachev’s minor, yet indispensable partner, setting the framework for the dramatic changes that neither man anticipated happening anytime soon. These ironies, rather than detracting from Reagan’s significance, should instead put it in proper perspective. Ultimately, by striving to end the nuclear arms race and avoid Armageddon, he contributed to the dynamics that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In that process, his emotional intelligence was more important than his military buildup his political credibility at home was more important than his ideological offensive abroad and his empathy, affability, and learning were more important than his suspicions. This paper focuses on a fascinating paradox of his presidency: By seeking to talk to Soviet leaders and end the Cold War, Reagan helped to win it. Leffler Scholars, like contemporary observers, continue to argue heatedly over the quality of President Ronald Reagan’s strategy, diplomacy, and leadership.
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